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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ANITA J. ROBINSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 15331 
This is an appeal from a decision by the Industrial 
Commission of Utah finding that Plaintiff had voluntarily left 
her employment without good cause and denying her Unemployment 
Compensation for the six weeks from February 20, 1977, to 
April 2, 1977, under U.C.A. §35-4-5(a). 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Industrial Commission of Utah through its Board 
of Review affirmed a previous decision of a Department of 
Employment Security Appeals Referee. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks reversal of Defendant's decision. 
Further, Plaintiff requests the Court to declare U.C.A. 
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§35-4-S(a) invalid, insofar as it chills the exercise 
of religious and other freedoms guaranteed by the United 
states and Utah Constitutions, by denying a public entitle-
ment due to the exercise of these rights. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff was employed by the University of Utah 
as a Secretary/Stenographer from September 21, 1976, to 
February 3, 1977, when she left due to unreasonable working 
conditions. She was originally hired with the mutual under-
standing of all parties that she was simultaneously employed 
by the Bureau of Reclamation from 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. and 
that her eight-hour day at the University of Utah would begin 
at 11:00 a.m. 
On numerous occasions during the course of her 
employment, Plaintiff's employer required her to work more 
than eight hours, not always even paying compensation, and 
on occasion in spite of physical illness. There were 
occasions when the employer required Plaintiff to work on 
Sundays in violation of her religious beliefs. The employer 
made no attempt to allow Plaintiff to deal with certain personal 
difficulties such as moving or visiting her sick mother. 
Plaintiff's personal freedoms apart from that of religion 
were spitefully and unreasonably infringed by the employer's 
sudden demands for Sunday and other overtime work. In November, 
1976, the employer attempted to prevent Plaintiff from exer-
cising her right to vote. The employer additionally cri ticizeii, 
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chastised, and embarassed Plaintiff with false charges of 
improper performance in her trade in the presence of other 
employees. 
In the light of these numerous difficulties and 
unconstitutional restrictions on her freedoms, Plaintiff 
was required to terminate her employment on February 3, 1977. 
She was informed she would be fired in any case, on February 
4, 1977. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PLAINTIFF DID NOT LEAVE WORK VOLUNTARILY 
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, BUT LEFT DUE TO 
INFRINGEMENT OF HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION. 
This Court's review is limited to deciding whether 
there is "substantial competent evidence to sustain the 
findings and decisions of the Appeals Referee and the Board 
of Review." Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U.2d 131, 477 
P.2d 587, 588 (1970). In the instant case, the evidence 
presented renders Defendant's final decision unsustainable 
under the law. 
U.C.A. §35-4-5(a), under which Defendant made its 
decision, provides: 
An individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
(a) For the week in which he has left work 
voluntarily without good cause, if so found 
by the commission, and for not less than one 
or more than the five next following weeks, 
as determined by the commission according 
to the circumstances in each case, provided 
that when such individual has had no bona 
fide employment between the week in which he 
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voluntarily left such work without good 
cause and the week in which he filed for 
benefits he shall be so disqualified for 
the week in which he filed for benefits 
and for not less than one or more than 
the five next following weeks. 
Various courts have defined "good cause." Defendant's own 
General Rules of Adjudication 210 provide an excellent summary 
of the principles found in so many of these cases: 
"Good Cause", as used in the unemployment 
insurance system, is such a cause as justifies 
an employee's voluntarily leaving the ranks of 
the employed and joining the unemployed; the 
leaving must be for such a cause as would reasonably 
motivate in a similar situation the average worker 
to give up employment with its wage rewards to 
become unemployed. The term suggests, as minimum 
requirements, real circumstances, substantial 
reasons, objective conditions, perceivable forces, 
adequate excuses that will bear the test of reason, 
just grounds for action. To constitute good cause, 
the circumstances which compel the decision to 
leave must be real, not imaginary; substantial, 
not trifling; and reasonable, not whimsical. 
There must be some compulsion from some outside 
and necessitous circumstance. The standard 
of what constitutes good cause is the standard 
of reasonableness as applied to the average 
individual and not to the supersensitive . 
... Standing alone, the fact that a worker 
accepted a particular job does not make the 
job suitable. After a reasonable trail [sic] 
he may have found it to be, in fact, unsuitable. 
Thus the question of "good cause" is to be determined 
from the particular circumstances of each case. Wilton v. 
Employment Division, 553 P.2d 1071 (Or.App. 1976). Another 
court went further to say in Sauls v. Employment Security 
Agency, 377 P.2d 789, 793 (Ida. 1963), citing National 
Furniture Manufacturing Company v. Review Board of Indiana, 
170 N.E.2d 381: 
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"We are of the opinion that all the circumstances * * * 
in each case of voluntary quitting have to be 
considered, and that if there are other factors 
involved, such as provocation brought on by unjust 
reprimands or unjust discrimination between 
employees or any other evidenciary factors which 
would have a strong influential effect upon the 
mind of the employee contributing to or causing 
him to voluntarily quit his employment, such 
contributing factors might, under certain circum-
stances, be considered as good cause within the 
purview of the Act, sufficient to enable the 
employee voluntarily quitting his job to secure 
compensation under the Act*** ". 
Against the backdrop of these considerations, the testimony 
at the hearing shows that Plaintiff accepted the particular 
job willing to occasionally work on Saturday but expressly 
and emphatically stipulating not on Sunday. (R.0028, 0032, 
0035, 0036, and 0039). Plaintiff further stated at R.0010: 
However, I made the stipulation when I began 
working there that I would not or did not wish 
to work on Sundays. This I made quite clear 
so that I only came in on Sundays when emergency 
situation was arising and I needed the Saturday 
that she had asked me to come in to work on to 
complete urgent personal business and I asked 
that liberty because I realized that in order 
to keep my job that it was imperative that I 
work for her that weekend. It would have been 
much to my advantage to have had the entire 
weekend off but did not ask for it off as I 
could see that she was making it a crucial 
"test" that I work that weekend. This was in 
view of the need for me to complete my move 
that weekend to another apartment in order not 
to have to pay double apartment rent. I did, 
however, make the stipulation quite clear when 
or before I began working there that I did not 
wish to work on Sundays. I believe that Sundays 
are a day of rest and whatever way and mode you 
may wish to worship is fitting for your conscience. 
-5-
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The employer, while at first attempting to maintain 
that such a stipulation as to Sunday work had not been made, 
came around to admitting it at R.0031: 
Q. Did she discuss, ever discuss this matter 
of Sunday working with you, to the end that it 
be discontinued? 
Ms. Leininger. Never. She never. The first, 
uh, and really on the first time she said she 
would be prefer it's true she preferred to work 
Saturday afternoon and I said that would be fine. 
I said it would never be any more than one or 
two Saturdays a month. [Emphasis added.] 
In fact, Saturday work appears to have been the norm, 
with Sundays added. These were such infringements on religious 
freedom as have been harshly conde11U1ed by courts nationwide, 
led by the United States Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 
374 U.S. 398 (1963) where a Seventh-Day Adventist had been 
denied unemployment compensation benefits for leaving her 
employment, because it required her to work on her Sabbath, 
a Saturday rather than Sunday. At 374 U.S. 403 the Court 
stated: 
We turn first to the question whether the 
disqualification for benefits imposes any 
burden on the free exercise of appellant's 
religion. We think it is clear that it does. 
In a sense the consequences of such disqualifi-
cation to religious principles and practices 
may be only an indirect result of welfare 
legislation within the State's general compe-
tence to enact; it is true that no criminal 
sanctions directly compel appellant to work a 
six-day week. But this is only the beginning, 
not the end, of our inquiry. fFn. omitted.] 
For "[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is 
to impede the observance of one or all religions 
or is to discriminate invidiously between 
religions, that law is constitutionally invalid 
even though the burden may be characterized as 
being only indirect." Braunfeld v. Brown, supra 
(366 US at 607). Here not only is it apparent 
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that appellant's declared ineligibility 
for benefits derives solely from the practice 
of her religion, but the pressure upon 
her to forgo that practice is unmistakable. 
The ruling forces her to choose between 
following the precepts of her religion 
and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, 
and abandoning one of the precepts of 
her religion in order to accept work, 
on the other hand. Governmental imposition 
of such a choice puts the same kind of 
burden upon the free exercise of religion 
as would a fine imposed against appellant 
for her Saturday worship. 
To this is added the language of the above-cited 
General Rules of Adjudication 210: "ILmight also be said that 
good cause exists when the work is such that the claimant 
might have rightfully refused it as unsuitable if it were 
offered to him while he was unemployed." 
More recently, the Sherbert case was relied on 
in Lincoln v. True, 408 F. Supp. 522 (W.D.Ky. 1975). That 
court also based its decision on 42 u.s.c. §1983, which states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of 
any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States 
or other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress. 
In Utah the individual right and freedom to hold 
religious beliefs is protected with similar strength. 
The Utah Constitution, Art. I, §1 declares: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; to acquire, possess and protect 
property; to worship according to the dictates 
of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, 
protest against wrongs, and petition for 
redress of grievances; to communicate freely 
their thoughts and opinions, being responsible 
for the abuse of that right. 
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The Utah Constitution provides further in 
Art. I, §4: 
The rights of conscience shall never be 
infringed. The State shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
no religious test shall be required as a 
qualification for any off ice of public 
trust or for any vote at any election; nor 
shall any person be incompetent as a 
witness or juror on account of religious 
belief or the absence thereof. 
And in Art. III: 
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable 
without the consent of the United States and 
the people of this State: 
First: ~ Perfect toleration of religious 
sentiment is guaranteed. No inhabitant of 
this State shall ever be molested in person 
or property on account of his or her mode of 
religious worship; but polygamous or plural 
marriages are forever prohibited. 
The fundamental right of religious freedom guaranteed 
in so many places in the Utah Constitution is surely not to be 
casually disregarded. Requiring Plaintiff to work on 
Sundays against her express religious belief and making 
her compliance with such demands a test of continued employ-
ment (R. 0010) can hardly be called "perfect toleration of 
religious sentiment." The right to not have religious 
beliefs infringed upon in employment is further guaranteed 
in the General Rules of Adjudication 90: "An individual 
who in good faith refuses or leaves employment on ethical 
or religious grounds is considered to have had good cause 
in so doing." 
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The sincerity of Plaintiff's beliefs such that they 
should be protected from infringement is shown not just by 
the testimony of all parties at the hearing, but also by 
the fact that Plaintiff felt compelled to initiate a grievance 
proceeding protesting infringement (R.0032, 0036, 0039) 
That these procedures were not prosecuted to fruition 
was clearly a result of Plaintiff believing that further 
effort would be futile and possibly harmful to her continued 
employment, as shown at R.0036: "Ms. Robinson. I was 
told by Mr. Hubbard that there probably wasn't a law that 
would support my request." R.0039-40 further shows 
Plaintiff's principles concerning Sunday work and discourage-
ment from the grievance procedure: 
Q. How many Sundays all told, during the five 
months you were there, did you have to work? 
Ms. Robinson. I should not have had to work any. 
Q. Uh, that wasn't my question. Let's let 
my rephrase that. How many Sundays did you 
work? As a total? 
Ms. Robinson. I would say probably two. 
Q. Two. And, uh, since you objected to that 
evidently you talked to the, uh, 
Ms. Robinson. Mr. Hubbard. 
Q. Mr. Hubbard, the Employer Relations Repre-
sentative. Why didn't you continue your grievance 
through him on that matter, reduce it to writing 
as he requested. He asked you if you would reauce 
it to writing, you did object to that and that was 
the right you had you could have exercised do 
correct this situation. 
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Ms. Robinson. It, uh, I talked with Mr. Hubbard 
and he, uh, seemed to indicate that even if I 
had requested this and asked that, uh, there be 
a decision made on this, the decision could 
still be such that I would be required to work 
on Sundays. So that it would not have been 
advantageous to me from my own personal, uh, 
chasing, or belief, or chasing not to work on 
Sundays. 
Q. But, you could have still reduced this to 
writing as he requested. He testified that 
he asked you to make your appeal, or your 
grievance in writing. This would allow some 
basis to take action. This is a course open 
to you. 
Ms. Robinson. Well, if I understood it would 
have done any good so I didn't feel 
Although most cases hold that an employee is not 
required to attempt to work out his grievances, Plaintiff 
even comes within those cases that do so hold. Glennen 
v. Employment Division, 549 P.2d 1288, 1289 (Or.App. 1976), 
states this requirement: 
[T]hat in order to have good cause for leaving 
work, an employe with grievances about employ-
ment must indicate an effort to work out the 
problem unless the employe can demonstrate 
that such effort would be futile. [Citations 
omitted.] 
The Department of Employment Security reported its initial 
interview of Plaintiff as follows, at R.0047: 
Decision: Vol. left work w/good cause. 
Clmt tried to have situation corrected 
rather than leave but was required to 
work Sundays against the conditions 
of her hire & rel. conviction. 
RS 
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II. PLAINTIFF DID NOT LEAVE vlORK VOLUNTARILY 
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, BUT LEFT DUE TO 
INFRINGEMENT OF HER FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO 
VOTE. 
Defendant has endorsed further harassment of 
Plaintiff by her employer. 28 u.s.c. §1343 provides a 
cause of action against the State for infringements of 
the right to vote. Further, the Utah Constitution, Art. 
I, §17 provides: "All elections shall be free, and no 
power, civil or military, shall at any ~ime interfere 
to prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage." 
Plaintiff left work due to an employer who deliberately 
attempted to prevent her from exercising this right, knowing 
her desire to vote but giving made-work to keep her late 
in the office until ten minutes before the polls closed. 
Plaintiff had to go from the job at the University of Utah 
to Sugarhouse to Voting District #2482 within that ten 
minutes, jeopardizing her safety. (R.0012, 0034) She 
was the very last to vote according to the pollbook. That 
Plaintiff by seconds was able to exercise her voting right 
does not obscure the employer's persistent obstruction. 
The United States Supreme Court has ruled on the protected 
status of the right to vote time and time again. As stated 
in Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963): 
This court has consistently recognized that 
all qualified voters have a constitutionally 
protected right "to cast their ballots and 
have them counted at congressional elections." 
-11-
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United States v. Classic, 313 US 299, 315, 85 
Led 1368, 1377, 61 S Ct 1031; see Ex Parte 
Yarbrough, 110 US 651, 28 Led 274, 4 S Ct 
152; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 US 58, 45 Led 
84, 21 S Ct 17; Swafford v. Templeton, 185 
US 487, 46 Led 1005, 22 S Ct 783. 
Again in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968), citing 
a previous United States Supreme Court case: 
No right is more precious in a free country 
than that of having a voice in the election 
of those who make the laws under which, as 
good citizens, we must live. Other rights, 
even the most basic, are illusory if the 
right to vote is undermined. [Fn. omitted.] 
Even if a constitutional right is not denied absolutely, a 
chilling effect on the exercise of that right is likewise 
unconstitutional, as held in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 631 (1969): 
If a law has "no other purpose ... than to 
chill the assertion of constitutional rights 
by penalizing those who choose to exercise 
them, then it [is] patently unconstitutional". 
United States v. Jackson, 390 US 570, 581 ... (1968). 
III. PLAINTIFF DID NOT LEAVE WORK VOLUNTARILY 
WITHOUT GOOD CAUSE, BUT LEFT DUE TO 
HARASSMENT AND UNREASONABLE WORKING 
CONDITIONS. 
The employer here, also engaged in a constant 
campaign of criticism, ridicule, and harassment, demon-
strated by the nature and number of harsh letters sent from 
Plaintiff's supervisor, dated Nov. 30 (R.25), Jan. 18 
(R.0023), Jan. 31 (R.0024) and Feb. 3 (R.0022). As if 
this barrage was not enough, the employer insisted on demeaning 
Plaintiff by making unfounded accusations against her in 
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front of fellow workers (R.0011, 0012, 0040). The 
harassment was apparently without just cause as the 
Plaintiff was never charged with inadequate job perform-
ance. Nowhere in relation to Plaintiff's Unemployment 
Compensation claim are there any allegations of mis-
conduct such as would disqualify her from benefits. Plaintiff 
stated at R.0039: 
Ms. Robinson. As far as my job performance, 
I have, uh, we kept copies of all the work 
that we did, original work, and I had a book 
of at least I would say, three or four inch, 
as large as those books that you have on 
your desk there, book and had started on 
another one. As far as production, my 
shorthand was corning along very well, in 
fact, on one day I took, uh, 28 or 30 pages 
of legal a typewriter pad, this full, over 
the telephone, in notes from her and typed, uh, 
subsequently the notes and I have a copy 
of that draft of notes showing that the steno 
and typing was satisfactory. 
Harassment is not too harsh a word for undue criticism 
of perfectly satisfactory work, as is here demonstrated by 
the letters and exacerbated by embarrassment in front of 
co-workers. This harassment compelled Plaintiff to leave 
her job and constituted good cause for leaving, as repeatedly 
held by the Oregon court: 
There is substantial evidence to support the 
referee's findings that claimant's supervisor 
was arbitrarily harassing claimant, that this 
harassment made claimant's working conditions 
such that a reasonable prudent workman would 
find them to be intolerable, and that therefore 
Claimant had "good cause" to quit her job. 
Stevenson v. Morgan, 522 P.2d 1204, 1207 
(Or.App. 1974). 
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And in Chamberlee v. Employment Division,541 P.2d 165, 166 
(Or.App. 1975): 
Good cause has been defined as "such 
cause as would compel a reasonably prudent 
person to quit under similar circumstances." 
Brotherton v. Morgan, 17 Or.App. 435, 
438, 522 P2d 1210, 1212 (1974) . One 
of the circumstances which may provide 
good cause to leave employment, is harass-
ment by one's employer. 
The employer here further refused to cooperate with 
Plaintiff when she was trying to move (R.0035) or when she 
wanted to visit her sick mother (R.0011). Plaintiff was 
required to work all different hours of the day on an unde-
pendable basis (R.0041). The employer kept Plaintiff 
overtime, knowing that Plaintiff was physically debilitated 
through illness (R.0040-41): 
Q. How long had you been working that day? 
Ms. Robinson. I had been working the same number 
of hours I had been working any other day. 
Q. From 7:00 in the morning? 
Ms. Robinson. Right, but I had been ill the 
day before. I indicated to her that I was very 
tired, that I hadn't been feeling well the day 
before. She required me to work until I think 
it was 9:30, maybe it was later than that, 9:30 
10:00 at night and by that time I was so very 
tired I could almost phys was unable physically 
completely to drive home. 
Q. Uh-huh. 
Ms. Robinson. I have checked several people who 
could attest to this if they would, whatever 
wish to do so. Uh, I told her that when I 
went home she required me to work to 10:00 or 
9:30 10;00 that night and when she did this 
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I decided, uh, I was not going to quit my 
government job and felt this was absolutely 
unnecessary for her to require a person to 
work beyond what they considered, I had been 
working perhaps when I was tired before, but 
I was so very tired, completely exhausted at 
that point I felt it was very unreasonable 
and inhumane for her to require me to continue 
working. 
The employer also refused to allow Plaintiff to schedule 
her compensatory time, which was accumulated overtime, 
(R.0036), as had been agreed under the terms of Plaintiff's 
hiring. 
No reasonable worker would put up with these 
harassments, noncooperation in every aspect of employment, 
criticism, and infringement of constitutional freedoms. A 
worker would be entirely justified in refusing a job with 
such harassments and restrictions, as stated in the General 
Rules of Adjudication 210, "It might also be said that good 
cause exists when the work is such that the Claimant might 
have rightfully refused it as unsuitable if it were offered 
to him while he was unemployed." In this case, it would be 
more reasonable for a person to leave such work than to 
remain. Only a very abnormal and unusual person would 
remain under such circumstances. 
CONCLUSION 
Since there is no substantial evidence to support 
disqualification of Plaintiff on the grounds of voluntarily 
leaving without good cause, but overwhelming evidence of 
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such intolerable working conditions that any reasonable 
person would leave, Defendant's decision of disqualification 
should be reversed. If Defendant's decision were left to 
stand, it would serve to endorse the infringement of consti-
tutional rights as a reasonable condition of work. Judgment 
should be entered that as a matter of law Plaintiff is 
entitled to Unemployment Compensation benefits from February 
20, 1977, until April 2, 1977. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Lucy Billings 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIF:CATE OF DELIVERY 
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I hand-delivered a copy 
of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff/Appellant to K. Allan 
Zabel, Special Assistant Attorney General, Department of 
Employment Security, 174 Social Hall Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84147, on this 25th day of October, 1977. 
~/'fl.({~ 
Diana M. Hardman 
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